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Abstract
In this paper we contribute to the existing microeconomic literature on social
interaction, which has generally focused on social interaction from an individual’s
perspective. Given that decisions regarding social interaction are often made within
the context of a couple or family, we explore the potential interdependence between
the social interaction of husbands and wives from both a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. We develop a theoretical framework based on an extension of Becker
(1974) to include factors which characterise aspects of a couple’s decision-making in
relation to social interaction and show that these factors support a tendency towards
a positive correlation between the husband’s and wife’s levels of social interaction.
Indeed, our empirical findings suggest such a positive association between the social
interaction of husbands and wives as measured by active club membership and the
frequency of the social interaction activities. In addition, we find that this positive
association is particularly pronounced across the same types of club membership or
social activities.
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JEL Classification : D12; D14
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1 Introduction and Background
Over the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in the economics literature
in the implications of social interaction and social capital for socio-economic outcomes
such as educational attainment and employment (see, for example, Brown and Taylor,
2007; Iannaccone, 1998; Glaeser et al., 2002). The focus has generally been on analysing
social interaction at the individual level. Such an approach, however, does not allow for
the fact that decisions regarding social interaction are often made within the context of
a family or couple. Hence, there has been limited discussion in the existing economics
literature of the potential interdependence between decisions regarding social interaction
at the household level.
Such interdependence may reflect assortative mating whereby individuals match with
individuals with similar characteristics and preferences to themselves. Hence, with pos-
itive assortative matching, an individual who is disposed to joining and participating
in clubs or groups is likely to match with an individual who is similarly inclined. In-
deed, it may be the case that such people meet their future partners when participating
in such activities. On the other hand, interdependence between a husband and wife’s
social interaction may reflect the coordination of child care and household responsibili-
ties within a couple. Such responsibilities may serve to limit the extent to which both
partners are able to engage in social interaction or the time available for such activities.
Additionally, the findings in the household labour supply literature suggest that married
individuals enjoy spending leisure time together (see, for example, Hamermesh, 2000;
Hallberg, 2003; Jenkins and Osberg, 2005). Hence, married individuals may engage in
joint social interaction during their leisure time.
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to explore the potential interdependence between
the social interaction of husbands and wives in order to further our understanding of
the determinants of social interaction, which has been found in the existing literature
to play a key role in social and economic development. At the microeconomic level,
for example, empirical evidence supports a positive association between education and
social interaction. Indeed, Glaeser et al. (2002), who report evidence supporting a posi-
tive correlation between education and social interaction, argue that this relationship is
not only well known in the social capital literature, but is also ‘one of the most robust
empirical regularities in the social capital literature.’ (Glaeser et al., 2002, p.F455). In
addition, Brown and Taylor (2009) report a positive association between parental social
interaction and the academic test scores of their children thereby highlighting an inter-
generational dimension to the relationship between educational attainment and social
interaction. Whilst at the macroeconomic level, there has been considerable discussion
of the benefits of social capital and social interaction for economic growth (see, for ex-
ample, Knack and Keefer, 1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010).
The next section presents the theoretical framework which motivates our economet-
ric analysis, which exploits household level panel data to explore the potential interde-
pendence between the social interaction between husbands and wives. Our theoretical
framework develops the model of social interaction due to Becker (1974). We augment
the model to include factors which characterize aspects of a couple’s decision-making in
relation to social interaction that might not be relevant for non-couples. We show that
these factors support a tendency towards a positive correlation between the husband’s
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and wife’s levels of social interaction even in the case of negative assortative match-
ing and establish that this tendency may persist in the presence of children where one
partner takes on the main responsibility for childcare provision. Our empirical findings,
based on jointly modelling the social interaction of husbands and wives, suggest that
there is a positive association between the social interaction of husbands and wives.
Moreover, our empirical findings endorse adopting a joint modelling approach. In ad-
dition, we find that this positive association is particularly pronounced across the same
types of club membership or social activities.
2 Theoretical Framework
We now set out a theoretical framework of social interaction based on Becker (1974)
which we later extend to include interplay within couples in the determination of each
other’s social interaction choices. In Becker’s (1974) model, social interaction is in-
troduced into the framework of household behavior by allowing the production of the
household’s commodities to be affected by the characteristics of non-household individ-
uals. In the model, the utility for individual i:
Ui = Ui(Zi1, ..., ZiQ), (1)
is expressed in terms of commodities or wants1, Ziq (q = 1, ..., Q), that are consumed
by i and produced according to the production function:
Ziq = Ziq(yiq, tiq, ei, Riq1, ..., RiqL). (2)
In Eq. (2) yiq and tiq are, respectively, goods or services and time devoted by i to the
production of commodity q, ei captures i’s relevant personal and environmental charac-
teristics (e.g., education and experience), and Riql (l = 1, ..., L) are the characteristics
of L ‘other’ individuals that affect i’s output of commodity q.
The central argument in Becker (1974), through which it departs from the tra-
ditional household model of production (e.g., Michael and Becker, 1973), is that the
individual is able to influence it’s social environment (represented by the characteristics
of non-household members, RiqL), by undertaking social interaction. It is these social
interaction ‘investments’ which form the basis for our theoretical characterisation of
social interaction in this paper.
2.1 Explaining the Social Interaction of Couples
In this section we develop a theoretical framework that allows us to examine the social
interaction investments of couples in the context of a household with associated partner
interrelationships.2 Like Becker (1974), we include social interaction in our model by
allowing an individual i’s production of a commodity Z, which they consume, to be
affected by the characteristics of ‘others’ (or non-household individuals) and that the
1See, for example, Bentham (1789) and Marshall (1962) who discuss social interaction in the wider
context of wants and their determinants.
2However, we are careful to select certain partner interrelationships concerned directly with social
interaction to take an endogenous role in our model and explicitly exclude others, e.g., the endogenous
determination of the household allocation of time to specialisation in job market or household work, so
as to maintain clarity and transparency.
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individual can affect the characteristics of ‘others’ by making ‘social interaction’ invest-
ments, si. We adapt the model of Becker (1974) to include two agents (i = 1, 2) each
making simultaneous choices about social interaction investments - thereby attempting
to influence the characteristics of the non-household individuals.3 For simplicity we
summarise the non-household characteristics through a single non-household individual
n (hence L = 1 in Eq. (2)).
Following Becker (1974), we assume that the characteristics, Ri, of the non-household
individual n relating to individual i, have two components:4
Ri = Ri(Di, si), (i = 1, 2), (3)
where si represents investments by i to affect the characteristics of n and Di is the level
of Ri when si = 0. We assume that Ri is increasing and concave in both its arguments.
Since we are interested in taking into account possible interplay between the members
of the couple in terms of social interaction investments, we allow the production function
of one partner to be dependent upon the social interaction of the other partner. For
simplicity, we assume that only one of the pair, individual 1, exhibits this and that
individual 2’s production function depends only on their own social interaction. Hence
the characteristics of the non-household individual with respect to individual 2, R2, are
also important to individual 1. In particular, we assume that individual 1 gains from
the social interaction of the partner 2 since the non-household individual characteristics
relating to 1 are enhanced by R2. In accordance with Eqs. (1) and (2), utility for
individuals 1 and 2, can be expressed in general terms as:
U1 = U1(Z1(R1(R2)), T1), (4a)
U2 = U2(Z2(R2), T2). (4b)
where Ti is the total time available to individual i. Maximising utility for individual i is
now equivalent to maximising the output of commodity Z based upon the utility-output
function:
Ui = Zi(Ri, Ti). (5)
Given that R2 is of interest to individual 1, we allow individual 1 to make cross-
partner investments, sx, in individual 2’s social interaction.
5 Hence Eq. (3) becomes:
R1 = R1(D1(sx, s2), s1), (6a)
R2 = R2(D2(sx), s2). (6b)
We assume that Di(.) (i = 1, 2) is increasing and concave in its element(s). Hence, in-
vestments by individual 1 in their partner’s social interaction sx, have a direct (indirect)
and positive effect on the non-household characteristics with respect to individual 2 (1).
We assume throughout that the marginal benefit to individual 1 of an increase in sx is
3In Becker (1974) social interaction in relation to non-household individuals is treated separately
from social interaction within the household. In this paper we combine the two.
4Unlike Becker (1965) we do not treat the components as perfect substitutes.
5To motivate this, note that the characteristics of n towards individual 1 are influenced by the social
interaction of the partner, hence individual 1 might find it productive to invest in boosting their partner’s
social interaction.
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at least as great as the effect of an increase in s2 since individual 1 can always select
to pay for the activity under sx that individual 2 would have opted for at the margin
under it’s next best s2 investment. Individual 1 will, however, select the sx which suits
themselves the best.6
Whereas Becker (1974) includes a single good y as an input into the production of
Z, we include time. Let:
Ti = T
E
i + T
H
i + T
S
i , (i = 1, 2), (7)
where TSi is the time required in the production of Ri, T
E
i is the time devoted to paid
employment and THi is the time devoted to household productivity.
7
It is now clear that the input of time, TSi , required in the production of Ri (i = 1, 2)
can also be specified in terms of si, hence Eq. (7) can be written:
T1 = T
E
1 + T
H
1 + t
S
1 s1 + t
S
xvsx, (8a)
T2 = T
E
2 + T
H
2 + t
S
2 s2 + t
S
xfsx. (8b)
where tSk is the constant time per unit sk (k = 1, 2, x). For individual 2, T
S
2 includes
time devoted to their own s2 investments as well as those received from the partner,
sx. We use t
S
xv to represent the variable part of time associated with sx experienced
by individual 1 who undertakes the search for sx and t
S
xf to represent the time that
individual 2 expends in undertaking a unit of sx which is fixed. For simplicity, through-
out we assume that the fixed part of the social interaction, relating to undertaking the
activity itself rather than the search is common across all activity types, hence tSxf ≤ t
S
i
(i = 1, 2) since the former includes no search cost.
An important assumption in our argument, then, is that TSi incorporates not only
time devoted to producing Ri, it also includes time involved in searching for Ri prospects:
hence, we envisage a scenario in which there is imperfect information over the available
production opportunities and so our model involves search costs. Let s˜i be the stock
of social interaction of individual i, where higher levels of s˜i are associated with lower
search costs. Assuming that there is information sharing in the household we assume
that search costs for individual i are a function of both individuals’ stocks of social
interaction, hence:
tSk = t
S
k (s˜1, s˜2), (k = 1, 2, xv), (9)
where tSk is non-increasing and convex in both its arguments. Hence, if in an earlier
period individual i accumulates a large stock of social interaction because, say, social
6It is worth noting that though sx and s2 could be perfect substitutes in U2, this is unlikely in reality.
Indeed, in U2, sx may even be inferior. Recall, sx investments are made by individual 1 to raise U1
through R2 and R1 and not through U2. In practice, though not modelled here, sk investments will have
a direct effect on utility, possibly both positive and negative, through the social interaction experience
itself rather than just through the effect it has on the characteristics of non-household individuals. Here,
individual 1 is interested in the R2 impact of sx investments only and there may be little incentive for
1 to select sx investments that yield direct utility to individual 2. Of course, individual 2 may or may
not engage fully with the social interaction associated with sx, and this may act as a ‘participation’
constraint on the ‘quality’ of sx investments from a U2 perspective.
7In this paper we are not concerned with explaining the allocation of time for household production
and hence leave this as exogenously determined.
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interaction has a high priority in their utility function, then in the next period it may
lead to a reduction in the costs of social interaction for both i and eventually the other
member of the couple, −i (−i 6= i = 1, 2), after search cost-saving information has been
shared.
In addition to the time constraints Eqs. (8a) and (8b), we have two budget con-
straints:8
I1 =
∑
v=1,x
svps, (10a)
I2 = s2ps, (10b)
where Ii is the money income of individual i and ps is the price of a unit of social inter-
action, which for convenience we assume constant and common across all sk (k = 1, 2, x).
It is well known (e.g., Becker, 1965) that Eqs. (8a), (8b), (10a) and (10b) can be
collapsed as follows:
M1 = wT1 + V1 =
∑
v=1,x
svps + wt
S
v (s˜1, s˜2)sv, (11a)
M2 = wT2 + V2 = s2ps + wt
S
2 (s˜1, s˜2)s2 + wt¯
S
xsx, (11b)
where Mi is the ‘full income’ (see Becker, 1965) and Vi is the non-labour income of in-
dividual i and w is the wage rate which we assume common to both individuals.9 Note,
tSx (s˜1, s˜2) ≡ t
S
xv and t¯
S
x ≡ t
S
xf .
It follows that maximising utility, Eq. (5), can now be meaningfully expressed in
terms of sk, hence:
U1 = U1(s1, sx; s2), (12a)
U2 = U2(s2; sx). (12b)
The maximisation problem can now be stated as:
max
s1,sx
U1(s1, sx; s2) = U1(s1, sx; s2), s.t. M1 =
∑
v=1,x
svps + wt
S
v (s˜1, s˜2)sv, (13a)
max
s2
U2(s2; sx) = U2(s2; sx), s.t. M2 = s2ps + wt
S
2 (s˜1, s˜2)s2 + wt¯
S
xsx, (13b)
with associated Lagrangians:
L1 = U1(s1, sx; s2) + λ1(M1 − {
∑
v=1,x
svps − wt
S
v (s˜1, s˜2)sv}), (14a)
L2 = U2(s2; sx) + λ2
(
M2 − s2ps − wt
S
2 (s˜1, s˜2)s2 − wt¯
S
xsx
)
. (14b)
8Note, whilst individual 1 pays, and incurs the search cost, for sx, individual 2 is assumed to incur the
time cost of consuming sx. It is possible that individual 2 participates less fully in sx than s2 activities.
Ultimately, we allow for this in the set up of the model and this does not impact on our results so long
as individual 2 behaves as expected by individual 1 under sx investments e.g., a limited but positive
participation being enough to have the desired influence on R2.
9In this paper we are concerned with understanding the possible implications of the interplay within
couples of their social interaction and wish to keep this separate from the modelling of the household
allocation of labour. Hence we do not allow Vi to be non-pooled and T
H
i to be determined exogenously,
e.g., by institutional factors.
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The first order conditions for a maximum under the Cournot-Nash assumption are
then:10
∂L1
∂s1
=
∂U1(s1, sx; s2)
∂s1
− λ1(ps + wt
S
1 (s˜1, s˜2)) = 0, (15a)
∂L2
∂s2
=
∂U2(s2; sx)
∂s2
− λ2(ps + wt
S
2 (s˜1, s˜2)) = 0, (15b)
∂L1
∂sx
=
∂U1(s1, sx; s2)
∂sx
− λ1(ps + wt
S
x (s˜1, s˜2)) = 0, (15c)
∂L1
∂λ1
=M1 − ps(s1 + sx)− w[t
S
1 (s˜1, s˜2)s1 + t
S
x (s˜1, s˜2)sx] = 0, (15d)
∂L2
∂λ2
=M2 − s2ps − w[t
S
2 (s˜1, s˜2)s2 + t¯
S
xsx] = 0. (15e)
Note that the second order conditions are satisfied under the usual assumptions.
Taking total differentials of Eqs. (15a)-(15e) and forming the Hessian:11
∣∣H∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
U1(11) U1(12) U1(1x) −α1 0
0 U2(22) U2(2x) 0 −α2
U1(x1) U1(x2) U1(xx) −αx 0
−α1 0 −αx 0 0
0 −α2 −wt¯
S
x 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (16)
Note that under the usual assumptions, a sufficient condition for |H| < 0 is that
U1(1x)t
S
1 (.) ≥ U1(12)t¯x. However, we earlier noted that t¯x ≤ t
S
1 (.), since the former
contains no search cost element, and U1(1x) ≥ U1(12), as individual 1 can always choose
the best s2 investment at the margin as its next sx investment, but will ultimately
choose an sx that yields it the greatest benefit at the margin. Hence, we can make the
following comparative static observations using Cramer’s rule. First, we consider how
the stock of information (s˜1, s˜2) influences social interaction investments.
sign
{
∂s2
∂s˜1
}
= −sign{α2{U1(x1)[αxws2t
S
2(1)(.)− w
2t¯x(s1t
S
1(1)(.) + sxt
S
x(1)(.))]
− α1[w
2λ1t
S
x(1)(.)t¯x + U1(xx)ws2t
S
2(1)(.)]} (17)
− αx{U1(11)[αxws2t
S
2(1)(.)− w
2t¯x(s1t
S
1(1)(.) + sxt
S
x(1)(.))]
− α1[w
2λ1t
S
1(1)(.)t¯x + U1(1x)ws2t
S
2(1)(.)]}.
It follows from Eq. (17) that if tS2(1)(.) is sufficiently greater than t
S
1(1)(.) and t
S
x(1)(.)
then ∂s2/∂s˜1 > 0. For instance, if partner 1 has accumulated a high stock of social
interaction information so that in the present period their search costs for s1 and sx are
10We opt for the assumption of independent rather than joint maximisation here in recognition of the
fact that, as previously noted, sx investments might not be the same as s2 (e.g., inferior in U2) and would
not logically feature in the optimising bundle of sk under joint maximisation. The assumption also helps
to preserve transparency of the ‘couple effects’ that are at play in the model: couple effects on social
interaction come through information sharing to reduce search costs and cross-partner investments.
11Subscripts in parentheses ‘(ab)’ represent partial derivatives with respect to sa and to sb where
(a, b = 1, 2, x). Also, for simplicity αk ≡ (ps + wt
S
k (.)) and ta(b) indicates the partial derivative of ta
with respect to s˜b (a, b = 1, 2, x).
7
low (and hence α1 and αx are small relative to α2) and relatively insensitive to further
accumulation of social interaction information then tS1(1)(.) and t
S
x(1)(.) are close to zero.
On the other hand, by sharing the stock of social interaction information with partner 2
this might lead to tS2(1)(.) being a quite large negative term, resulting in an increase in s2.
We now consider how a change in the available time or income of individual 2 influ-
ences the investment of that individual in their own social interaction:
sign
{
∂s2
∂M2
}
= −sign
{
α2
(
α1[U1(xx)α1 − U1(x1)αx]− αx[U1(1x)α1 − U1(11)αx]
)}
> 0.
(18)
Hence, if there is a reduction in M2 due to, for instance, having children which impacts
on TH2 rather than T
H
1 (lowering the time available for work and/or social interaction),
then s2 also falls. However, it is also possible that under a fall in M2 there can be
offsetting effects in individual 2’s social interaction via sx investments.
sign
{
∂sx
∂M2
}
= −sign
{
α1α2
[
U1(12)αx − U1(x2)α1
]}
. (19)
Hence Eq. (19) is negative and a fall in M2 leads to a rise in sx if [.] > 0 which requires
that the (weighted) change in marginal benefit to individual 1 of an extra unit of s1 is
greater following an increase in s2 relative to an increase in sx. Of course, in the case
that sx and s2 are perfect substitutes, [.] > 0 under the usual assumptions.
In this section we have developed a theoretical framework for analysing factors which
may influence social interaction of individuals who are part of a couple. Our analysis
suggests that where there are differences in the stock of, or preference for, social inter-
action within the couple, then there are factors at play which will tend to harmonise
the levels of social interaction through information sharing which reduces search costs
or through cross-partner social interaction investments. However, where both partners
exhibit common levels in the stock of, or preference for, social interaction the ‘cou-
ple effect’ is unlikely to make the balance of social interaction less equal and based on
the factors analysed here (information sharing and cross-partner investment) the effect
is likely to be small.12 Indeed, where, for instance, the couple have children and the
burden of childcare rests with one partner, though this reduces the carer’s own social
interaction investment, there may exist offsetting cross-partner investments in their so-
cial interaction from the non-carer. Hence, our theoretical model suggests, in addition
to a positive correlation between the social interaction of members of the couple due
to, say, positive assortative matching, there will also be a tendency towards a positive
correlation where one partner has a higher stock of, or preference for, social interaction
due to, say, negative assortative matching.
12In reality it seems likely that the ‘couple effect’ would be augmented by joint consumption synergies.
Whilst explicit modelling of synergies is beyond the scope of the current study, we observe that if, for
instance, joint consumption resulted in a reduction in price of a unit of social interaction, then this
would boost the total level of social interaction for the couple meaning that the ‘couple effect’ may even
be quite large in the case of couples with common high levels in the stock of, or preference for, social
interaction. At the same time, the inclusion of synergies is unlikely to alter the harmonising influence
of the ‘couple effect’ as observed here.
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3 Data and Methodology
In order to explore the existence of a positive correlation between the social interaction of
members of a couple from an empirical perspective, we use data drawn from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a survey conducted by the Institute for Social and
Economic Research comprising approximately 10,000 annual individual interviews. For
wave one, interviews were conducted during the autumn of 1991. The same households
are re-interviewed in successive waves - the latest available being 2008. Information is
gathered relating to adults within the household, thereby providing detailed information
on both the husband and wife within the household.13
Specifically, for the 1991 to 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 waves, hus-
bands and wives were asked whether they were currently active in a range of clubs/groups,
namely: a political party; trade unions; an environmental group; a parents’/school asso-
ciation; a tenants’/residents’ group or neighbourhood watch; a religious group or church
organisation; a voluntary services group; any other community or civic group; a social
club/working mens’ club; sports club; womens’ institute/townswomen’s guild; or any
other group or organisation. Our focus on active membership follows Putnam (2000),
p.58, who argues that:
‘...formal “card-carrying” membership may not accurately reflect actual involvement
in community activities. An individual who “belongs to” half a dozen community
groups may actually be active in none. What really matters from the point of
view of social capital and civic engagement is not merely nominal membership, but
active and involved membership.’
Hence, we use the responses to the series of questions on active club membership
described above in order to proxy the social interaction of the husband and wife by
constructing an index of the number of clubs that the husband is currently active in and
an index of the number of clubs that the wife is currently active in. Each index runs
from zero clubs to three plus clubs. The four point indexes are defined as follows, where
the figures refer to the percentages in each category.
Number of clubs (NCLUBS)
HUSBAND WIFE
0 51% 54%
1 31% 29%
2 12% 11%
≥ 3 6% 6%
OBSERVATIONS 18,492
It is apparent that approximately 50% of husbands and wives are not an active mem-
ber of any club, whilst only 6% of husbands and wives are active members of three or
more clubs. The following provides a cross tabulation of the active club membership
of husbands and wives, where clearly the most dominant category at 35% is for neither
13Our sample includes both married and co-habiting couples aged 18 to 65. Following the literature
on household labour supply, see, for example, Hallberg (2003), we focus on heterosexual couples only,
thereby omitting 0.58% of the observations.
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member of the couple to be an active club member, followed by both individuals being
an active member of 1 club. Only 1% of couples are active members of 3 or more clubs.
Number of clubs (NCLUBS)
HUSBAND
0 1 2 ≥3
0 35% 12% 4% 1%
WIFE 1 12% 14% 4% 2%
2 3% 4% 3% 2%
≥3 1% 2% 2% 1%
Our measure of social interaction based on club membership accords with that fre-
quently used in the existing literature, see, for example, Putnam (2000), Glaeser et al.
(2002) and Brown and Taylor (2009).
In order to jointly model the social interaction of husbands and wives, we specify
a bivariate ordered probit model, see Greene and Hensher (2009), which allows for the
joint modelling of two underlying unobserved continuous latent variables, NCLUBS
∗
WIFE
ct
and NCLUBS
∗
HUSBAND
ct , as follows:
NCLUBS
∗
WIFE
ct = γ1NCLUBS
HUSBAND
ct−1 +X
WIFE
ct
′φ1 +H
′
ctpi1 + ε1ct (20a)
NCLUBS
∗
HUSBAND
ct = γ1NCLUBS
WIFE
ct−1 +X
HUSBAND
ct
′φ2 +H
′
ctpi2 + ε2ct (20b)
What we do observe are the ordered dependent variables, NCLUBS WIFE and
NCLUBS
HUSBAND , where the continuous latent variable is observed in discrete form
through a censoring mechanism where the underlying latent variable is split into multi-
ple categories defined as:
{
NCLUBS
WIFE
ct = j
NCLUBS
HUSBAND
ct = k
}
if
{
µWIFEj−1 < NCLUBS
∗
WIFE
ct ≤ µ
WIFE
j
µHUSBANDk−1 < NCLUBS
∗
HUSBAND
ct ≤ µ
HUSBAND
k
}
where there are c = 1, 2, ..., C couples each comprising a husband and wife, and
there are t = 1, 2, ..., T time periods, and µWIFEj and µ
HUSBAND
k thresholds (j = 1, 2, ..., J
and k = 1, 2, ...,K). We control for the husband’s social interaction in the wife’s social
interaction equation and vice versa in order to explore whether direct effects of a spouse’s
level of social interaction exist. We lag the control for the level of social interaction of
the spouse in order to mitigate against the possibility of reverse causality. Both ε1 and
ε2 are white noise error terms, ε1, ε2 ∼ N(0, 0, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, ρ), which are correlated within
couples, i.e.: (
ε1ct
ε2ct
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
1, ρ
ρ, 1
)]
where the covariance is given by σ12 = ρσ1σ2. Hence, the correlation parameter is given
as follows ρ = σ1σ2
σ12
. To allow for repeated observations over time, the standard errors
are clustered by couples.
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The vectors XWIFE and XHUSBAND contain wife and husband specific covariates and
H contains household level characteristics common to both equations. The wife and
husband specific characteristics that we control for in XWIFE and XHUSBAND are: being
aged between 18 to 24, aged 25 to 34, aged 35 to 44, aged 45 to 54, aged 55 and above
(the omitted category); the highest level of educational attainment, distinguishing
between degree level, nursing or teaching qualification, Advanced (A) levels, General
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSEs), other educational qualifications and no
educational qualifications (the omitted category);14 being in good or very good health;
an indicator for whether health limits daily activity; a binary indicator for whether
he/she likes the neighbourhood; whether he/she has regular caring responsibilities
either within or outside the household; a binary indicator for being solely responsible
for household chores (grocery shopping, cooking, washing/ironing and cleaning);15
labour force status, distinguishing between employment, self-employment, unemploy-
ment and being out of the labour force (the omitted category). The household level
characteristics controlled for in H include: whether there are children aged 0 to 4;
children aged 5 to 11; children aged 12 to 16; or children aged 16 to 18 in the household
(where having no children is the reference category); the number of other adults in
the household (excluding the husband and wife); the natural logarithm of household
labour income; the natural logarithm of household non labour income; housing
tenure to proxy household wealth, i.e. owning the home without a mortgage, owning
the home with a mortgage and renting from the council. Controls are also included
for region of residence (16 binary indicators) and year throughout the empirical analysis.
Table 1A provides the summary statistics for the sample associated with active
club membership, where: the most populated age category, regardless of gender, is
being aged between 35-44; the majority of individuals are in excellent or good health;
females are more likely to be solely responsible for household chores and spend more
time caring for others than males; and over 80% of households either own their home
outright or on a mortgage.
We explore the robustness of our findings by also analysing an alternative measure
of social interaction that allows for the intensity of social interaction over time, namely
the frequency of the social interaction of husbands and wives. Such a measure, in
contrast to the measure based on club membership, which is more commonly used in
the existing literature, provides a time dimension to the social interaction activities.
Specifically, we exploit the information available in the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006 and 2008 waves of the BHPS, which relates to the frequency at which husbands
and wives: attend leisure activity groups such as evening classes, keep fit, yoga etc;
attend meetings for local groups/voluntary organisations; or do unpaid voluntary
work. For each category, individuals are asked to indicate the frequency as follows: at
least once a week; at least once a month; several times a year; once a year or less; or
14GCSE level qualifications are taken after eleven years of formal compulsory schooling and approx-
imate to the U.S. honours high school curriculum. The A level qualification is a public examination
taken by 18 year olds over a two year period studying between one to four subjects and is the main
determinant of eligibility for entry to higher education in the UK.
15We control for being responsible for household chores and caring responsibilities since time spent
on such activities reduces time available for other activities including those involving social interaction.
It should be acknowledged that some of the explanatory variables are arguably endogenous. Given that
our aim is to explore the positive association between the social interaction of husbands and wives,
rather than to establish causal relationships, such issues are not problematic in this context.
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never/almost never.
We group these different types of social interaction into a single index for each
spouse adopting a hybrid combination of the questions by generating an additive
scale based upon Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0 to 4, where the scale of reliability
for the frequency of social interaction has a value of 0.7. The frequencies at which
social interaction is undertaken are defined as follows, where the figures indicate the
percentages in each category:
Frequency of social interaction (FSOC)
HUSBAND WIFE
0=never/almost never 58% 49%
1=once a year or less 26% 30%
2=several times a year 10% 12%
3=at least once a month 5% 7%
4=at least once a week 1% 2%
OBSERVATIONS 11,203
In accordance with active club membership, it is apparent that the most populated
category for husbands and wives represents the lowest level of frequency of social
interaction, with the least populated category being social interaction on the most
frequent basis, i.e. on a weekly basis. Again, we provide cross tabulations for the
social interaction of husbands and wives. As found with the number of clubs, the most
populated category, at 35%, is couples that ‘never or almost never’ undertake social
interaction and around only 1% of couples engage in social interaction at least once a
month.
Frequency of social interaction (FSOC)
HUSBAND
0 1 2 3 4
0 35% 10% 3% 1% 0%
1 15% 10% 3% 2% 0%
WIFE 2 5% 3% 2% 1% 0%
3 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
4 1% 1% 0% 0% 0%
As with modelling the number of clubs, we estimate a bivariate ordered probit model,
where there are two unobserved latent variables FSOC
∗
WIFE and FSOC
∗
HUSBAND , as fol-
lows:
FSOC
∗
WIFE
ct = λ1FSOC
HUSBAND
ct−1 +X
WIFE
ct
′φ1 +H
′
ctpi1 + ε1ct (21a)
FSOC
∗
HUSBAND
ct = λ1FSOC
WIFE
ct−1 +X
HUSBAND
ct
′φ2 +H
′
ctpi2 + ε2ct (21b)
Again, what we do observe are the ordered dependent variables, FSOC WIFE and
FSOC HUSBAND , defined as:
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{
FSOC
WIFE
ct = q
FSOC
HUSBAND
ct = r
}
if
{
µWIFEq−1 < FSOC
∗
WIFE
ct ≤ µ
WIFE
q
µHUSBANDr−1 < FSOC
∗
HUSBAND
ct ≤ µ
HUSBAND
r
}
where there are c = 1, 2, ..., C couples each comprising a husband and wife, and
there are t = 1, 2, ..., T time periods, and µWIFEq and µHUSBANDr thresholds (q =
1, 2, ..., Q and r = 1, 2, ..., R). The error structure is the same as that described above
for modelling the number of clubs. Additional controls in XWIFE and XHUSBAND due to
data availability in these waves of the BHPS are the frequency at which the individual:
undertakes sport/swimming/walking; goes to the cinema/concerts/theatre or other live
performances; and goes to the pub or meals out. These additional variables allow us to
explore the relationship between social interaction and different types of leisure activi-
ties. As with modelling the number of clubs, we include the lag of the spouse’s social
interaction measure to reduce the potential for reverse causality. The other covariates
are as defined above for Eqs. (20a) and (20b). Summary statistics associated with this
sample are presented in Table 1B.
4 Results
In Table 2 we present the results relating to the joint modelling of the active club
membership of husbands and wives. Specifically, in Table 2, we present the estimated
coefficients and the regression diagnostics. The correlation in the error terms is
positive and statistically significant thereby endorsing the joint modelling approach
and suggesting that the social interaction of the wives and husbands are affected in the
same way by unobserved factors.16 In a similar vein, Jenkins and Osberg (2005), who
explore the implications of leisure coordination, estimate multivariate probit models in
order to investigate the interdependence between husbands’ and wives’ propensities to
be active in a social group/working men’s club, and in a sports club, and report positive
correlations between these propensities. It is apparent that the number of clubs that the
husband was an active member of in the previous wave has a positive and statistically
significant influence on the number of clubs that the wife is an active member of in the
current period.17 This positive association is also apparent in modelling the current
club membership of the husband.18
16A fixed effects logit framework with clustered standard errors at the household level would be a
possible alternative modelling strategy. Such an approach, however, would not enable us to ascertain
the dependence or otherwise, as indicated by the ρ parameters, in the husband and wife’s propensities
to engage in social interaction. In addition, the categories of the dependent variable would have to be
collapsed to a binary outcome and there would be a potential loss of observations due to the omission
of individuals with time invariant dependent variables.
17The importance of the joint modelling approach is apparent when comparing the estimates from
the bivariate framework with that from estimating two separate ordered probit models for husbands
and wives. For both measures of social interaction, the effect of the spouse’s social interaction in the
previous period is considerably higher within the separate ordered probit models suggesting that not
allowing for the interdependence in social interaction within a couple may lead to overestimates of the
effect of the spouse’s social interaction.
18The panel structure of the data allows us to control for pre-existing levels of social interaction.
Hence, in order to explore the robustness of the positive association between the husband’s and wife’s
social interaction, we repeat the analysis including a lagged dependent variable in each equation in
order to control for time invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. The estimated coefficient on
the lagged dependent variable in each equation is found to be positive and statistically significant. We
find that the positive effect from the spouse’s level of social interaction however remains statistically
significant but is reduced in magnitude.
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We will briefly comment on the other covariates before returning to the marginal
effects associated with the focus of our interest, namely the measures of social inter-
action, i.e. active club membership. Our findings generally tie in with the existing
literature. Active club membership is increasing in age for both husbands and wives
as indicated by the pattern of the estimated coefficients on the age dummy variables,
although the effect is less pronounced for husbands. Educational attainment is also
positively and monotonically associated with club membership for both spouses, as is
being in good or excellent health. The labour market status controls appear to follow
a less distinct pattern with being employed or self-employed having an insignificant
effect on club membership for wives relative to being out of the labour force, whereas
being unemployed is inversely associated with club membership for wives. In contrast,
for husbands, all of the labour force status controls are inversely associated with club
membership relative to being out of the labour force. Responsibility for household
chores only influences active club membership for husbands, whereas caring responsi-
bilities are positively associated with club membership for both spouses. Such caring
activities may, for example, be associated with social interaction such as volunteering
activities. Having children aged 5 to 11 or 16 to 18 have a positive influence on club
membership for wives, whereas having children aged 5 to 11 and aged 12 to 15 is
positively associated with club membership for husbands. Finally, household labour
income is positively associated with club membership for both husbands and wives,
although household non labour income only has a positive effect on club membership
for husbands.19
Tables 2A and 2B present the marginal effects associated with the estimates in
Table 2. Table 2A presents the marginal effects of the wife’s club active membership
at t − 1, evaluated at the mean, on the joint probability associated with the two
dependent variables. For example, along the diagonal, the focus is on the effect of
the wife’s club active membership at t − 1 on the probability that the current club
membership of the husband and wife take the same value. Comparing the marginal
effects presented in Tables 2A and 2B, it is apparent that the marginal effects associated
with the husband’s social interaction in t − 1 are generally greater in magnitude than
those associated with the wife’s social interaction in t − 1. With respect to Table 2A,
the previous club membership of the wife has a relatively large inverse effect on the
probability of both spouses currently being a member of no club. In contrast, previous
club membership of the wife is positively associated with both spouses being a member
of one, two and three or more clubs, although the sizes of the marginal effects diminish
as the number of clubs increases. This pattern of marginal effects is mirrored in Table
2B, where the covariate of interest is the husband’s club membership in the previous
period. Evaluated at the mean, both the husband’s and the wife’s club membership in
the previous period decrease the probability of both the husband and the wife being
a member of no clubs in the current period by approximately 2 percentage points.
This corresponds to around a 6% increase in the unconditional probability that both
19As expected, the effects of some of the covariates are found to be smaller here than in models when
the spouse’s social interaction is not included. This is particularly evident for explanatory variables such
as education, age and having children in the two youngest age categories. Such findings highlight the
importance of jointly modelling social interaction in this way for members of a couple and indicate that
the effects of some variables such as education may have been overestimated for married individuals
within the previous literature.
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members of the couple are not active members of any club.20
In order to explore whether this positive association is influenced by the type of
social interaction, we construct three club membership variables indicating the number
of clubs the individual is a member of according to the following categories: ‘political
and social issues’ (a political party; a trade union; or an environmental group); ‘specific
interest/community issues’ (a parents’/school association; a tenants’/residents’ group
or neighbourhood watch; a religious group or church organisation; a voluntary services
group; any other community or civic group); other groups (a social club/working
men’s club; sports club; women’s institute/townswomen’s guild; or any other group
or organisation). We then repeat the analysis three times, with each of the three
club membership variables specified as the dependent variable whilst controlling for
the spouse’s lagged membership in each of the three types of clubs. The findings are
summarised in Table 3, where we present the estimated coefficients relating to the
key covariates of interest, namely spouse’s lagged club membership.21 In Panel A, it
is apparent that a statistically significant and positive association is found between
membership of clubs related to political and social issues of the husband and wife.
Furthermore, the effects of membership of the two other types of clubs are found to be
statistically insignificant. In addition, the ρ parameter remains positive and statistically
significant and is larger in magnitude than that presented in Table 2. Such findings
accord with positive assortative matching whereby individuals with similar interests
and preferences match but are also consistent with the ‘couple effects’ identified in our
theoretical analysis. A similar pattern of results is found in Panel B when the dependent
variable indicates membership of clubs associated with specific interest/community
issues, with a relatively large and statistically significant ρ parameter indicating a strong
degree of interdependence in modelling the membership of such clubs of husbands and
wives. For the other clubs category, the pattern of results presented in Panel C is not
so clear cut. A positive correlation is found between the membership of other types
of clubs of husbands and wives, again supporting the notion of positive assortative
matching and/or ‘couple effects’. A positive relationship is also found between the
wife’s current membership of other clubs and the husband’s lagged membership of clubs
associated with specific interest/community issues. In contrast, an inverse association
is found between the husband’s current membership of other clubs and the wife’s lagged
membership of clubs associated with specific interest/community issues. Such findings
may partly reflect the heterogenous nature of the other clubs category, which may also
account for the estimated ρ parameter being smaller in magnitude for this model as
compared to the models presented in Panels A and B.
In Table 4, we present the results relating to the frequency at which the husband
and the wife engage in social interaction. It is apparent that, as with active club
membership, the frequency at which the spouse engaged in social interaction in the
previous period is positively associated with the frequency of current social interac-
tion for both the husband and the wife.22 As in Table 2, the correlation between
20This is found by comparing the marginal effect to the cross tabulation of couples’ active club
membership presented in Section III.
21The additional control variables, as in Table 2, are included in the set of explanatory variables, but,
for brevity, are not presented in Table 3. The findings related to these variables accord with those in
Table 2.
22It is possible that the level of social interaction - as measured by active club membership and the
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the error terms is positive and statistically significant although smaller in magnitude
than for active club membership, yet once again endorsing the joint modelling approach.
Before discussing the marginal effects associated with the frequency of social
interaction, we comment briefly on the additional covariates in this model. It is
interesting to note that the frequency at which the husband or wife engages in sport,
swimming or walking and the frequency at which they go to the cinema or theatre are
both positively associated with the frequency at which the husband and wife engage in
social interaction. Such findings suggest that couples that engage in social interaction
are also active in other areas.
The marginal effects associated with the estimated model presented in Table 4 are
given in Tables 5A (relating to the wife’s social interaction in t − 1 evaluated at the
mean) and Table 5B (relating to the husband’s social interaction in t − 1 evaluated at
the mean). The pattern of the marginal effects on the joint probabilities associated
with the husband and wife’s frequency of current social interaction accords with that
in Tables 2A and 2B relating to active club membership, with positive marginal effects
apparent across the lead diagonal as we move from annual to weekly social interaction
for both spouses. Evaluated at the mean, the frequency of the husband’s social
interaction in the previous period decreases the probability that both the husband
and wife do not engage in social interaction in the current period by approximately
3 percentage points. This corresponds to around a 9% increase in the unconditional
probability that both members of the couple never or almost never undertake social
interaction.23
We repeat the analysis presented in Table 3 related to distinguishing between the
type of social interaction. In the case of the frequency analysis, we explore two different
types of activity, namely: attending leisure activity groups such as evening classes, keep
fit and yoga; and attending meetings for local groups/voluntary organisations or doing
unpaid voluntary work. The findings are summarised in Table 6, where, in Panel A,
the frequency at which the individual attends leisure activity groups is specified as the
dependent variable and, in Panel B, the frequency at which the individual engages in
meetings for local groups/voluntary organisations or unpaid voluntary work is speci-
fied as the dependent variable. In Panel A, it is apparent that a positive and highly
statistically significant association between the husband and wife’s social interaction as
measured by leisure activity groups is found, supportive of positive assortative match-
ing and/or ‘couple effects’ (e.g., through a pronounced reduction in the search costs
associated with these specific activities or cross-investment due to one partner’s stock
of, or preference for this type of social interaction) identified in the theoretical analysis.
Interestingly, a less pronounced positive effect in terms of statistical significance is found
frequency of social interaction - in the previous time period may not necessarily be representative of
an individual’s level of social interaction. This may occur for a variety of reasons: for example, an
individual may have just moved house or job. In order to explore the robustness of our findings, we
replace the lagged measure of social interaction with the average level of social interaction measured
over the previous waves as a time varying moving average. Our empirical findings are robust to using
this measure and confirm the positive association between the husband’s and wife’s social interaction as
well as endorsing the joint modelling approach.
23In order to explore the robustness of our findings, we also repeat the analysis splitting the sample
into couples with and without children. Both the pattern and size of the marginal effects are very similar
across both samples, with a positive correlation coefficient found for both samples.
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for the effect of the spouse’s participation in local groups/voluntary organisations and
unpaid voluntary work on the frequency at which the individual engages in leisure ac-
tivity groups. Furthermore, the estimated ρ parameter is considerably larger than that
reported in Table 4. A similar pattern of results is evident in Panel B, although the ρ
parameter is smaller in magnitude which may again reflect the heterogenous nature of
the dependent variable in this case.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have contributed to the existing microeconomic literature on social
interaction by analysing the social interaction of couples. The existing literature has
generally modelled social interaction from the perspective of an individual rather
than within the context of a couple or family. Given that decisions regarding social
interaction are often made within a household context, we have explored the potential
interdependence between the social interaction of husbands and wives from both a
theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Using a theoretical framework that we develop, based on Becker (1974), we show
that where there are differences in the stock of, or preference for, social interaction
within the couple, factors such as information sharing and cross-partner investment
will tend to equalise levels of social interaction. However, where both partners exhibit
common levels in the stock of, or preference for, social interaction the ‘couple effect’
is unlikely to make the balance of social interaction less equal. Indeed, for those with
a common low stock of, or preference for social interaction, the effect is unlikely to
be large. Hence, regardless of whether there is positive, negative or no assortative
matching, the interplay between the members of the couple has a tendency towards
correlated levels of social interaction.
Our empirical findings suggest interdependence between the extent of the social
interaction of husbands and wives and endorse our joint modelling approach. To be
specific, our empirical findings suggest that there is a positive association between the
social interaction of husbands and wives as measured by active club membership and
the frequency of the social interaction activities. Furthermore, we find that, for married
couples, the role of some socio-economic characteristics such as education may have
been overestimated in the existing literature. In addition, we find that this positive
association is particularly pronounced across the same types of club membership or
social activities.
Given the importance of social interaction for social and economic development, it
is important to understand the determinants of such activities at the individual and
household level. Our analysis therefore furthers our understanding of social interaction
within the context of a couple and hopefully will serve to stimulate future research in
this area.
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics - Sample for Number of Clubs
WIFE HUSBAND
MEAN STD MEAN STD
No. of clubs partner active member (t-1) 0.7226 0.8832 0.6952 0.8854
WIFE/HUSBAND specific covariates
Aged 18-24 0.0479 0.2135 0.0173 0.1302
Aged 25-34 0.2570 0.4370 0.1931 0.3947
Aged 35-44 0.2918 0.4546 0.2865 0.4521
Aged 45-54 0.2567 0.4368 0.2735 0.4458
Degree 0.1149 0.3189 0.1344 0.3411
Teaching or Nursing 0.2427 0.4287 0.2862 0.4520
A level 0.0986 0.2981 0.1133 0.3170
O level 0.2230 0.4163 0.1584 0.3652
Other qualification 0.0969 0.2959 0.0735 0.2610
Excellent or good health 0.7059 0.4557 0.7268 0.4456
Health limits daily activity 0.1326 0.3391 0.1126 0.3161
Employee 0.6434 0.4790 0.6726 0.4693
Self employed 0.0514 0.2208 0.1637 0.3700
Unemployed 0.0157 0.1242 0.0406 0.1973
Solely responsible for household chores 0.2106 0.4078 0.0038 0.0614
Likes current neighbourhood 0.9099 0.2862 0.8891 0.3139
Hours spent caring (0=none, 7=100+) 0.4596 1.2329 0.2805 0.9616
Number cared for outside family (0, ≥3) 0.1902 0.5063 0.1234 0.4241
Household covariates MEAN STD
Number of adults (other than husband or wife) 1.4111 0.7517
Children aged 0-4 0.1797 0.3839
Children aged 5-11 0.2758 0.4469
Children aged 12-15 0.1861 0.3892
Children aged 16-18 0.0481 0.2140
Log household labour income 11.9375 1.8286
Log household non labour income 10.5371 4.0935
Home owned outright 0.1786 0.3829
Home owned on a mortgage 0.6542 0.4756
Home rented 0.0842 0.2778
OBSERVATIONS 18,492
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Table 1B: Summary Statistics - Sample for Frequency of Social interaction
WIFE HUSBAND
MEAN STD MEAN STD
Frequency partner social interaction (t− 1) 0.6411 0.9079 0.8219 1.0124
WIFE/HUSBAND specific covariates
Frequency undertakes sport/swim/walking 2.5441 1.6716 2.4756 1.6974
Frequency goes to cinema/concerts/theatre 0.9986 0.7356 1.1106 0.8203
Frequency goes to pub or meal out 2.4955 0.9941 2.6575 1.0853
Aged 18-24 0.0392 0.1940 0.0146 0.1201
Aged 25-34 0.2278 0.4194 0.1695 0.3752
Aged 35-44 0.3070 0.4613 0.2955 0.4563
Aged 45-54 0.2631 0.4403 0.2728 0.4454
Degree 0.1456 0.3527 0.1588 0.3655
Teaching or Nursing 0.2829 0.4504 0.3278 0.4694
A level 0.1087 0.3113 0.1125 0.3160
O level 0.2004 0.4003 0.1466 0.3537
Other qualification 0.0853 0.2794 0.0612 0.2398
Excellent or good health 0.7239 0.4471 0.7494 0.4334
Health limits daily activity 0.1431 0.3502 0.1121 0.3155
Employee 0.6559 0.4751 0.6916 0.4619
Self employed 0.0490 0.2159 0.1611 0.3677
Unemployed 0.0144 0.1190 0.0266 0.1609
Solely responsible for household chores 0.2489 0.4324 0.0041 0.0639
Likes current neighbourhood 0.9229 0.2667 0.9115 0.2841
Hours spent caring (0=none, 7 = 100+) 0.4965 1.2791 0.3176 1.0188
Number cared for outside family (0, ≥3) 0.1504 0.3575 0.1906 0.4953
Household covariates MEAN STD
Number of adults (other than husband or wife) 1.4277 0.7723
Children aged 0-4 0.1725 0.3779
Children aged 5-11 0.1775 0.3821
Children aged 12-15 0.1475 0.3546
Children aged 16-18 0.0579 0.2336
Log household labour income 12.5766 1.2160
Log household non labour income 11.2023 3.9342
Home owned outright 0.1976 0.3982
Home owned on a mortgage 0.6530 0.4760
Home rented 0.0686 0.2529
OBSERVATIONS 11,203
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Table 2: Bivariate Ordered Probit Model - Number of Clubs Wife/ Husband is an Active
Member
WIFE HUSBAND
COEF T STAT COEF T STAT
No. of clubs partner active member (t− 1) 0.1334 (9.67) 0.1141 (8.31)
WIFE/HUSBAND specific covariates
Aged 18-24 -0.6478 (10.27) -0.1535 (2.06)
Aged 25-34 -0.4787 (9.55) -0.2260 (4.97)
Aged 35-44 -0.2974 (6.34) -0.1515 (3.53)
Aged 45-54 -0.1406 (3.71) -0.0391 (1.12)
Degree 0.8528 (14.47) 0.5922 (10.60)
Teaching or Nursing 0.5711 (12.34) 0.4894 (11.11)
A level 0.4503 (8.13) 0.3821 (7.24)
O level 0.3429 (7.42) 0.2877 (6.12)
Other qualification 0.1991 (3.72) 0.1676 (2.68)
Excellent or good health 0.0697 (2.78) 0.1104 (4.18)
Health limits daily activity 0.0639 (1.77) -0.0279 (0.67)
Employee -0.0326 (1.04) -0.1122 (2.30)
Self employed 0.0674 (1.27) -0.1843 (3.37)
Unemployed -0.1817 (2.23) -0.1302 (2.21)
Solely responsible for household chores 0.0295 (1.04) -0.3530 (2.14)
Likes current neighbourhood 0.2830 (6.61) 0.4667 (10.82)
Hours spent caring (0=none, 7 = 100+) 0.0255 (1.30) 0.0158 (1.32)
Number cared for outside family (0, ≥ 3) 0.1543 (6.29) 0.1329 (4.72)
Household covariates
Number of adults -0.0602 (3.33) -0.0220 (1.21)
Children aged 0-4 0.0191 (0.63) -0.0545 (1.90)
Children aged 5-11 0.3087 (11.63) 0.0887 (3.35)
Children aged 12-15 0.0255 (0.89) 0.0825 (3.00)
Children aged 16-18 0.1562 (3.50) 0.0238 (0.54)
Log household labour income 0.0761 (4.89) 0.0866 (5.40)
Log household non labour income 0.0041 (1.00) 0.0168 (3.92)
Home owned outright 0.0866 (1.50) 0.0772 (1.30)
Home owned on a mortgage 0.0488 (1.02) -0.0067 (0.13)
Home rented -0.1196 (1.99) -0.0756 (1.15)
CONTROLS Region (16) and year (10) dummies
Chi Squared (53); p value 970.50; p=[0.000]
ρ; Chi Squared (1) corr(ε1, ε2); p value ρ=0.2764; 491.43; p=[0.000]
OBSERVATIONS 18,492
Note: T statistics are based upon clustered couple effects over time.
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Table 2A: Marginal Effects - Number of Clubs Wife Member of (t− 1)
Dependent variable = no. Clubs
wife active member
0 1 2 3
Dependent variable 0 -0.0224 -0.0129 -0.0047 -0.0019
= no. clubs husband 1 0.0113 0.0036 0.0004 -0.0004
active member 2 0.0073 0.0052 0.0021 0.0008
3 0.0037 0.0041 0.0023 0.0015
Notes: (i) Marginal effects correspond to the model in Table 2; (ii) Number of
clubs wife member of (t− 1) is measured at the mean.
Table 2B: Marginal Effects - Number of Clubs Husband Member of (t− 1)
Dependent variable = no. Clubs
husband active member
0 1 2 3
Dependent variable 0 -0.0242 -0.0163 -0.0058 -0.0023
= no. clubs wife 1 0.0124 0.0050 0.0007 -0.0003
active member 2 0.0077 0.0050 0.0024 0.0009
3 0.0040 0.0050 0.0027 0.0017
Notes: (i) Marginal effects correspond to the model in Table 2; (ii) Number of
clubs husband member of (t− 1) is measured at the mean.
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Table 4: Bivariate Ordered Probit Model - Frequency Wife/ Husband Social Interaction
WIFE HUSBAND
COEF T STAT COEF T STAT
Frequency partner social interaction (t− 1) 0.1471 (9.29) 0.1328 (8.99)
WIFE/HUSBAND specific covariates
Frequency undertakes sport/swim/walking 0.1675 (17.62) 0.1352 (11.93)
Frequency goes to cinema/theatre 0.2806 (14.18) 0.2449 (11.95)
Frequency goes to pub or meal out -0.0446 (2.92) 0.0309 (1.95)
Aged 18-24 -0.2598 (3.08) -0.1409 (1.29)
Aged 25-34 -0.2671 (4.82) -0.1356 (2.42)
Aged 35-44 -0.1129 (2.22) -0.0139 (0.28)
Aged 45-54 -0.0832 (1.81) -0.0028 (0.07)
Degree 0.6762 (10.68) 0.5342 (8.46)
Teaching or Nursing 0.5246 (9.86) 0.4773 (8.52)
A level 0.3143 (5.03) 0.2874 (4.39)
O level 0.2749 (4.98) 0.1951 (3.17)
Other qualification 0.1940 (2.70) 0.0500 (0.66)
Excellent or good health 0.0691 (2.18) 0.1001 (2.89)
Health limits daily activity -0.0129 (0.30) 0.0434 (2.19)
Employee -0.1597 (4.37) -0.1457 (2.21)
Self employed 0.1076 (1.52) -0.0411 (0.56)
Unemployed -0.3387 (3.41) -0.1021 (1.04)
Solely responsible for household chores 0.0623 (1.99) -0.2152 (0.98)
Likes current neighbourhood 0.1605 (2.94) 0.2407 (3.56)
Hours spent caring (0=none, 7 = 100+) -0.0003 (0.02) 0.0434 (2.76)
Number cared for outside family (0, ≥3) 0.1546 (3.48) 0.1082 (2.19)
Household covariates
Number of adults -0.0135 (0.67) 0.0443 (2.18)
Children aged 0-4 -0.0233 (0.51) -0.0068 (0.18)
Children aged 5-11 0.0327 (0.58) 0.0173 (0.52)
Children aged 12-15 0.0289 (1.17) 0.0618 (1.74)
Children aged 16-18 0.0941 (1.52) 0.0196 (0.36)
Log household labour income 0.0442 (2.80) 0.0288 (1.91)
Log household non labour income -0.0015 (0.31) 0.0003 (0.05)
Home owned outright 0.0529 (0.79) 0.0506 (0.77)
Home owned on a mortgage -0.0089 (0.16) -0.0487 (0.83)
Home rented -0.1290 (1.66) -0.1218 (1.57)
CONTROLS Region (16) and year (6) dummies
Chi Squared (54); p value 2,129.88; p=[0.000]
ρ ; Chi Squared (1) corr(ε1, ε2) = 0 ; p value ρ = 0.1762; 127.43; p=[0.000]
OBSERVATIONS 11,203
Note: T statistics are based upon clustered couple effects over time.
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Table 5A: Marginal Effects - Frequency Wife Social Interaction (t− 1)
Dependent variable = frequency
wife social interaction
0 1 2 3 4
0 -0.0204 -0.0141 -0.0055 -0.0029 -0.0008
Dependent variable 1 0.0106 0.0052 0.0014 0.0004 -0.0001
= frequency husband 2 0.0057 0.0045 0.0018 0.0010 0.0002
social interaction 3 0.0033 0.0033 0.0016 0.0010 0.0003
4 0.0008 0.0011 0.0007 0.0005 0.0002
Notes: (i) 0=never/almost never; 1=once a year or less; 2=several times a year; 3=at least
once a month; and 4=at least once a week; (ii) Marginal effects correspond to the model
in Table 5; (iii) frequency of wife’s social interaction (t− 1) is measured at the mean.
Table 5B: Marginal Effects - Frequency Husband Social Interaction (t− 1)
Dependent variable = frequency
wife social interaction
0 1 2 3 4
0 -0.0300 -0.0140 -0.0046 -0.0021 -0.0005
Dependent variable 1 0.0122 0.0028 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
= frequency husband 2 0.0093 0.0048 0.0016 0.0007 0.0001
social interaction 3 0.0064 0.0044 0.0018 0.0010 0.0002
4 0.0022 0.0020 0.0010 0.0007 0.0002
Notes: (i) 0=never/almost never; 1=once a year or less; 2=several times a year; 3=at least
once a month; and 4=at least once a week; (ii) Marginal effects correspond to the model
in Table 5; (iii) frequency of wife’s social interaction (t− 1) is measured at the mean.
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